Marquette University

e-Publications@Marquette
Economics Faculty Research and Publications

Economics, Department of

10-1-2000

U.S. Corporations in Globalization
John B. Davis
Marquette University, john.davis@marquette.edu

Joseph P. Daniels
Marquette University, joseph.daniels@marquette.edu

Published version. "U.S. Corporations in Globalization," in Corporate Governance and Globalization:
Long Range Planning Issues. Eds. Stephen S. Cohen and Gavin Boyd. Cheltenham, ENG: Edward
Elgar Publishing, 2000: 190-215. Publisher Link. © 2000 Edward Elgar Publishing. Used with
permission.

6.

US corporations in globalization
John B. Davis and Joseph P. Daniels

1. INTRODUCTION
The major force affecting corporations and economic institutions over the last
two decads is globalization. A recent survey of the members of the American
Economic Association, interpreted by Pryor (2000) reveals that economists
see globalization as that factor (out of ten) most likely to have a major impact
on the economic system or its important institutions. In contrast to past
theories of trade, where firms could choose between exporting goods or
exporting capital, that is, producing abroad, globalization has given rise to a
'disintegration of the production process in which manufacturing or service
activities done abroad are combined with those performed at home' (Feenstra,
1998, p. 31). Hence, the old views of location of production activity are no
longer appropriate and relationships between trade, investment and
production activity are much more complex.
In the broadest sense, corporate governance consists of an interrelated set
of mechanisms relating boards of directors, ownership structures, institutional
and relational investors, and government and other stakeholder groups that
influence firm-level decisions over resoure allocation aim~ at maxi~ing
shareholders' returns. I The purpose of this chapter is to understand these firmlevel decisions in terms of the evolution and extent of globalization of US
industries as revealed by trade, production and investment data, and relate
these findings to theories regarding different systems of corporate
governance. We offer a number of insights into how the distinctive
characteristics of the US corporate governance system have helped US firms
respond to opportunities presented by global integration through changes in
trade, production and investment activities. We do not present original
empirical work, but rather use the empirical findings of other studies to throw
light on the US system. We also conclude that further research based on a
similar attempt to link evidence and theories will require much more
disaggregated data.
We begin our analysis in Section 2 by considering the duality of forces at
work, the strategic pursuit of profits as influenced by the corporate
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governance system and the pressures and opportunities of increased
globalization. Section 3 examines the extent of globalization of US industries,
quantifying the trade and investment channels of the process, as well as the
disintegration of the production process and increased global outsourcing. In
Sections 4 and 5 we use the economic theory of corporate governance to
explain how the US system of corporate governance influences how US frrms
are likely to approach global competition given the strengths and weaknesses
of that system in promoting capital investment. Section 5 relates the theories
of capital allocation to the quantitative data presented earlier. Section 6 offers
general conclusions on the globalization of US corporations in relation to the
US model of governance.

2.

GLOBALIZATION AND CORPORATE GOVERNANCE:
DUALITY OF FORCES

As the economies of the world become increasingly integrated, the extent and
effects of globalization have received greater and greater attention. The
political economy literature has rightly tended to focus on the macroeconomic
effects of globalization. Issues such as earnings inequality, employment
security, tax base stability and the role of the welfare state challenge free trade
positions grounded on the welfare gains from exchange (for example, Rodrik,
1997). Less research has been done on how corporate governance influences
global trade and investment in light of the strengths and weaknesses of
different types of governance structures in promoting capital investment.
As is well known, the forces of globalization and deeper integration are
numerous and affect different industries and firms unevenly. The effects of
globalization can be both direct and indirect, with contagion occurring far
down the customer and supply chain. Few industries and firms, then, can
escape the effects of globalization regardless of their choice to participate in,
or avoid, the international arena. Hence, corporate governance nece.§sarily
occurs in a global environment. :rnadciition, the globalization process and
corporate governance structures each influence one another, and accordingly
we must consider a duality of forces at work. The globalization process forces
changes in corporate governance structures through direct and indirect
channels, requiring that these structures adapt to the new opportunities
available and the competition firms face, as determined by political and
economic forces. At the same time, structures of different corporate
governance systems influence firms' strategic approaches, and therefore the
pace and pattern of globalization.
In the past, US firms exercised influence over the formation of trade policy
and management decisions of suppliers and competitors by acquiring sizable
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market shares. More recently, however, soaring levels of US global equity
holdings combined with the advantages of the US securities-based system of
corporate governance have given US firms and institutions new channels of
influence. Consider, for example, that the California Public Employees'
Retirement System (known as Calpers) garnered support from an array of
German pension funds, and forced changes in the two-tier shareholder
structure of a large German utility. Steinmetz and Sesit (1999, p. 1) comment
that the most significant effect of the surge in US global equity investment is
that it 'forces European companies to change the way they do business and
adopt American corporate values'.
Regarding corporate governance, we distinguish between management
thinking on corporate governance, and appropriate an international political
economy perspective and the economic analysis of corporate governance,
based on the theory of efficient capital allocation. An economic analysis of
corporate governance explains how principal-agent and insider-outsider
relationships affect firms' investment plans and, therefore, location of
production activity. Management thinking on corporate governance, built
upon general systems theory, describes how firms may be constrained by
possible conflicts with stakeholders, or groups affected by, and/or that can
affect, a firm's decisions, policies and operations. Though we focus on the
economic perspective, we contend that both perspectives are necessary, since
one reflects how unhindered firms would choose to invest domestically and
internationally, while the other reflects the political economic realities
involved in globalization.
The US system of corporate governance is a securities-based system of
corporate governance (sometimes called a neoclassical system of regulation)
which favours competitive capital markets, discourages intercorporate
cooperation, tips the balance of power between shareholders and corporate
management in the direction of the former, and tends to be associated with a
relatively unconcentrated corporate ownership structure, all reinforced by a
competition policy based in antitrust law. We argue that the US system of
corporate governance creates strong incentives for US firms involved in
certain types of production to avoid regulatory exposure through foreign
operations, while US firms involved in other types of production will have
weak incentives to do so. These developments, it should be noted, need not be
consistent with US macromanagement goals (cf. Daniels and Davis, 2000).

3.

THE EXTENT OF US GLOBALIZATION: TRADE,
PRODUCTION AND DIRECT INVESTMENT

[Dunning (1993, p. 54) argues that the activities of multinational enterprises
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are motivated by stakeholder interest, where stakeholders include employees,
management and shareholders. In contrast, neoclassical economic theory
asserts that residual income accrues to a firm's shareholders in the form of
profits paid as dividends, and that therefore profits motivate the actions of the
firm (and its managers). In discussing the 'OECD Principles of Corporate
Governance' Emmons and Schmid (Chapter 2, this volume) observe that both
shareholder and stakeholder rights are acknowledged, but ask whether
conflict between the two is not inevitable. Dunning also stresses that multinational activities may produce conflict between shareholders and stakeholders. Further, globalization strategies and the various exposures to risk
globalization may generate considerable stress between these constituencies
'even when each includes profit maximization in their objective functions.
Hence, globalizing firms may pursue a variety of different paths reflecting
conflict over both objectives and strategies.
Trade economists have generally considered two routes of global
expansion; globalizing through trade or globalizing through foreign direct
investment (FDI). Traditionally these strategies were viewed as being separate
or alternative means to globalization. That is, the exports of goods and capital
substitute for each other. Recent theoretical (for example, Markusen and
Venables, 1995) and empirical research (for example, Fontagne and Pajot,
1997) show that the relationship between trade and foreign direct investment
is much more complex, and that trade and foreign direct investment may
actually complement each other. That is, foreign direct investment may spur
greater amounts of trade, and trade may spur greater amounts of foreign direct
investment. Hence, the pursuit of profit maximization and the attempt to
balance various stakeholder groups may well require a mixed approach to
globalization. The approach in some industries may be increased trade
channels, in others the acquisition of a controlling share in a foreign establishment, and yet others a mix of both.
There is a further reason that the relationship between trade and investment
is complex. Global integration may be accompanied by a 'disintegration' of
the production process (Feenstra, 1998, p. 31) whereby a formerly integrated
domestic production activity becomes fragmented a~ portions of the
production process are outsourced to foreign production. This outsourcing
activity allows firms to concentrate on the highest value-added portions of the
total production process, making many US firms only responsible for
final stages of production. This complicates our standard model of
comparative advantage which explains advantage in terms of final goods and
services. In effect, a US manufacturing firm may find that it has a
comparative advantage in high value-added stages such as design and
marketing, but a comparative disadvantage in mass production. This
may not be reflected in industry-level data, and thus makes clear-cut
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conclusions about trade, production and investment difficult, though not
impossible.

3.1 Manufacturing
We begin our analysis of the evidence by considering global integration in the
manufacturing sector. We are not concerned with defining globalization or
integration per se. Neither do we classify industries as domestic or global
(see, for example, Makhija and Williamson, 2000). Rather we consider
industries along a continuum from relatively low to relatively high degrees of
integration.

3.1.1 Integration of the manufacturing sector
Campa and Goldberg (1997) examine the external orientation of
manufacturing in four different countries by considering the share of exports,
imports and imported inputs for 20 categories of manufactures. The purpose
of their study is to ascertain the exposure of these industries to international
events such as changes in trade policies and exchange rates. Their results are
particularly interesting in that they illustrate both direct and indirect
exposures that may exist from globalization. Direct exposures refer to
changes that affect the firm directly through effects on its price competitiveness or costs of inputs used in the production process. Indirect exposures refer
to changes that affect the firm'indirectly by impacting upon the firm's
competition, suppliers and customers.
Campa and Goldberg capture direct exposure by measuring the extent to
which an industry relies on exports and imported inputs. They capture part of
a firm's indirect exposure through the degree of import competition. The
levels of these shares are provided in Table 6.1 as are the changes in these
shares over a 20-year period.
Campa and Goldberg calculate each industry's external orientation by
netting the export and imported-input shares. The rationale for this measure is
that it shows how export-oriented firms are at least partially insulated against
exchange rate movements. For example, a firm facing appreciation of its
currency and loss of export sales, benefits from the reduced domestic
currency cost of imported inputs. Industries with the highest external
orientation, such as instruments and related products (15 per cent), industrial
machinery and equipment (14.8 per cent), electronic and other electrical
equipment (12.6 per cent), and tobacco products (11.9 per cent), do not rely
heavily on imported inputs, and therefore may be hurt by a domestic currency
appreciation. Goldberg and Crockett (1998) claim that industries with more
labour-intensive production processes are likely to have a lower importedinput share and, therefore, a higher external orientation. Comparing capital

Table 6.1

......

\Q

IJJ

Export and import market shares for manufacturing, 1995

Food and kindred products
Tobacco products
Textile mill products
Apparel and other textiles
Lumber and wood products
Furniture and fixtures
Paper and allied products
Printing and publishing
Chemicals and allied products
Petroleum and coal products
Rubber and miscellaneous products
Leather and leather products
S tone, clay and glass products
Primary metal products
Fabricated metal products
Industrial machinery and equipment
Electronic and other electric equipment
Transportation equipment
Instruments and related products
Other manufacturing
Total manufacturing
Note: * Change from 1975 level.
Source: Campa and Goldberg (1997, p. 57).

Export
share

Import
share

Importedinput share

Change in
export share*

Change in
import share*

Change in
input share*

5.9
14.9
7.6
7.4
7.6
5.5
9.0
2.4
15.8
3.9
9.2
14.4
5.6
11.2
7.9
25.8
24.2
17.8
21.3
13.5
13.4

4.2
0.6

4.2
2.1
7.3
3.2
4.3
5.7
6.3
3.5
6.3
5.3
5.3
20.5
4.7
10.6
8.7
11.0
11.6
15.7

2.6
8.0
2.5
5.4
0.4
4.2
3.1
0.8
5.7
2.2
4.4
10.5
2.2
6.1
1.6
2.5
13.1
2.0
4.5
3.6
5.0

0.5
0.0
4.8
22.9
3.4
11.1
4.1
0.6
7.4
-4.0
7.9
41.8
6.1
7.6
5.5
21.5
24.0
13.9
12.7
27.7
10.0

1.4
0.7
4.3
1.9
2.1
2.1
2.1
0.8
3.3
-1.5
2.6
14.9
2.6
5.6
4.0
6.9
7.1
9.3
2.5
5.3
4.1

9.1

31.4
10.3
14.1
10.0
1.6
11.0
5.7
12.8
59.5
9.5
17.4
8.5
27.8
32.5
24.3
20.1
41.1
16.3

6.3

9.9
8.2
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expenditure-labour unit ratios with the external orientation measure, as
shown in Table 6.2, does not reveal such a pattem. 2 Goldberg and Crockett
also argue that exchange rate changes disproportionately affect profitability
and investment spending in industries with the highest external orientation.

Table 6.2

Capital expenditure to labour unit and external orientation

Leather and leather products
Petroleum and coal products
Printing and publishing
Fabricated metal products
Furniture and fixtures
Textile mill products
Primary metal industries
Stone, clay and glass products
Food and kindred products
Transportation equipment
Paper and. allied products
Lumber and wood products
Misc. manufacturing industries
Rubber and misc. plastics· products
Apparel and other textile products
Chemicals and allied products
Electronic and other electric equipment
Tobacco products
Industrial machinery and equipment
Instruments and related products

Capital
expenditures
to labour

External
orientation

1 386.8
50971.5
4293.8
5407.6
2654.8
4538.8
11 383.4
9114.9
8058.2
8916.3
15355.6
5061.9
3861.6
7670.5
1 192.7
24927.2
15081.0
18837.2
6696.0
6698.4

-6.1
-1.4
-1 1
-0.8
-0.2
0.3
0.6
0.9
1.7
2.1
2.7
3.3
3.6
3.9
4.2
9.5
12.6
12.8
14.8
15.0

The data for all three measures shows that manufacturing has become much
more integrated in the global economy over the 20-year period, as the share
of exports increased an additional 5 per cent representing a 60 per cent gain
overall. The share of imports increased an additional 10 per cent, a 159 per
cent increase, while the share of imported inputs doubled to 8.2 per cent.
Campa and Goldberg further compare the ranking of the twenty industries for
the three share measures over the 20-year period. The industry rank
correlations are positive and significant, indicating that the most export-
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oriented industries remained so over the entire period. Likewise, the most
import-oriented remained so, though the increase in import shares differs
significantly across industries. The authors find that the difference in the
import shares widens considerably with import penetration increasing at a
much faster rate in high import-share industries, such as leather and leather
products, as compared to low import-share industries, such as tobacco and
printing and publishing. Using Spearman rank correlations, we find that
capital expenditures-labour unit ratios and changes in import shares are
significant and negative indicating that the increasing spread in import
penetration falls disproportionately on labour-intensive industries - industries
in which the US is at a comparative disadvantage.

3.1.2 Disintegration of production in manufacturing
The industry import and export shares cited above do not reveal the extent of
international trade in intermediate products. Advances in technology,
particularly communications technology, coupled with reductions in transportation costs have allowed firms to outsource various stages of the production
process, and focus on those segments of the value-added chain in which the
firm has a comparative advantage. For firms in the US, this means
increasingly that the manufacturing component of production is contracted
out to foreign sources, allowing traditional manufacturing enterprises to
concentrate on such high value-added activities as design and marketing.
Firms such as Ford now see their future in design, branding, marketing and
service operations, as opposed to automobile manufacture and traditional final
assembly (Burt, 1999). Others, relying on new information technology
combined with robotics and advanced production techniques, concentrate on
'mass customization' or customization of products on a large scale. Huffy, for
example, recently announced that the last of its US bicycle plants would shut
down, completing the firm's evolution into a 'multibrand design, marketing
and distribution company' (Aeppel, 1999, p. AI).
Evidence that outsourcing has become more important for the United States
is suggested by the rising ratio of US merchandise trade (the average of
imports and exports) to merchandise value-added since the 1980s (Irwin,
1996). A higher ratio of merchandise trade to value-added indicates a greater
share of imported inputs in final product value. Also, that advanced countries'
final product value tends to be high relative to final product value in
developing countries suggests that a higher share of imported inputs reflects
inputs having a higher degree of processing. Further evidence that this higher
share may reflect an increasing tendency on the part of advanced countries to
outsource the low-wage stages of the production process associated with light
assembly and manufacturing, while retaining domestically the high-wage
portions of the production process associated with design and more complex,
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less standardized forms of manufacture, comes from changing shares of US
exports and imports by end-use categories. To estimate the extent of
outsourcing, Feenstra (1998), following Irwin (1996), calculates the share of
exports and imports by ~nd-use categories for the US. For the United States,
as shown in Table 6.3, the first half of the century saw higher shares of raw
materials and industrial supplies in exports and imports, while since the 1980s
manufactured goods, including capital goods, at increasingly advanced stages
of processing, have occupied a larger share of total end-use categories.
Thus the US appears to be importing products that are closer and closer to
the final stage of production, allowing more and more of the earlier stages of
the production process to occur in foreign countries. But industry-level trade
data aggregates all stages of the production process and does not reveal the
degree to which US firms concentrate on the high value-added stages of
production, the stages of production in which they have a comparative
advantage. A more thorough examination of this phenomenon would require
us to consider firm-level data, which is generally unavailable.

3.1.3 Foreign direct investment shares in manufacturing
Expanded trade activity, whether vertical or horizontal, is but one path of
globalization. Another is through foreign direct investment: investment in the
form of capital, technology, management skills and so on, which is outside of
the country but within the structure of the investing company (Dunning, 1993,
p. 5). Table 6.4 provides the stock of FDI (historical basis) and share of
outstanding stock for the 20 manufacturing industries considered in Table 6.1.
It is important to note that the measures in Table 6.1 are flow measures as
they reflect the flow of goods and services over the course of a given period
whereas the measures in Table 6.4 are stock measures, indicating the level of
accumulated direct investment. Nonetheless, it is interesting to note that three
of the five industries with the highest FDI shares (chemicals, industrial
machinery and electronic equipment) are also in the top five for export shares,
yet no relationship appears to exist at the bottom of the categories. In general,
however, a positive ordinal relationship does appear to exist between FDI
shares and export shares. No relationship is evident between FDI shares and
import shares or imported input shares, or the changes in these shares.
Spearman rank correlations lead us to the same conclusion.3 We conclude,
therefore, that the relationship between trade patterns and FDI stocks are
complex and FDI is not a clear substitute for exports. This relationship is
revisited later in the chapter.

3.2 Services
The service sector is extremely important to the US economy as most recent

Table 6.3

Shares of exports and imports by end-use categories

Category
Foods, feeds and beverages

'0

\0

Industrial supplies and materials
Capital goods (except autos)
Consumer goods (except autos)
Automotive vehicles and parts

Source: Feenstra (1998).

Imports
Exports
Imports
Exports
Imports
Exports
Imports
Exports
Imports
Exports

1925

1950

1965

1980

1995

21.9
18.7
68.2
59.8
0.4
8.7
9.4
6.0
0.02
6.8

30.0
15.5
62.4
45.5
1.3
22.4
6.1
8.9
0.3
7.8

19.1
19.2
53.3
34.8
7.1
31.4
16.0
7.0
4.5
7.5

11.3
16.9
31.3
32.2
19.0
35.0
21.5

5.0
9.2
18.2
25.6
33.6
42.4
24.3

7.8

11.7

16.9
8.1

18.9
11.2
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Table 6.4 Stock and shares of FDI for manufacturing, 1995
FDI stock*

FDI share

Food and kindred products
Tobacco products
Textile mill products
Apparel and other textiles
Lumber and wood products
Furniture and fixtures
Paper and allied products
Printing and publishing
Chemicals and allied products
Petroleum and coal products
Rubber and miscellaneous products
Leather and leather products
Stone, clay and glass products
Primary metal products
Fabricated metal products
Industrial machinery and equipment
Electronic and other electric equipment
Transportation equipment
Instruments and related products
Other manufacturing

28896
3962
1 538
1 248
1 861
805
11 748
2344
61 374
19597
5291
134
2786
3927
7628
29626
27514
34076
11 676
7520

11.8
1.6
0.6
0.5
0.8
0.3
4.8
1.0
25.2
8.0
2.2
0.1

Total manufacturing

243954

100.0

Industry classificatic)O

1.1

1.6
3.1
12.1
11.3

14.0
4.8
3.1

Note: *MilIions of US$. Historical cost basis.
Source: Bureau of Economic Analysis, international Accounts Data.

figures show (OEeD, 1999a) that services contribute over 70 per cent of
GDP whereas manufacturing contributes slightly more than 18 per cent.
It is unfortunate, however, that private services transactions and US direct
investment abroad are not classified the same and are not directly
comparable. 4 Table 6.5 provides the export and import shares of total private
services for the 11 broad categories used by the Bureau of Economic
Analysis.
Table 6.6 provides the levels and shares of foreign direct investment for the
major categories tracked by the Bureau of Economic Analysis.
Because the import and export shares and FDr shares are not directly
comparable, there is little we can draw from their patterns. We note, however,
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Table 6.S Industry share of total private services exports and imports, 1995
Private services transactions

Travel
Passenger fares
Other transportation
Royalties and licence fees
Affiliated services
Education
Financial services
Insurance, net
Telecommunications
Business, professional and technical
Other

Share of total
exports
31.1
9.4
13.4
13.4
9.9
3.7
3.4
0.7
1.6

8.7
4.8

Share of total
imports
34.2
10.7
21.0
4.8
10.1
0.7
1.8
4.0
5.8
3.5
3.3

Source: Bureau of Economic Analysis, Private Services Transactions by Type.

the importance of exports to business services. We also note that the overall
stock of FDI in finance and services is slightly higher than in manufacturing,
though one would expect this to be a recent phenomenon. The relatively high
FDI shares in finance, insurance and business are also apparent.

3.3 The Link Between FDI, 1rade and Production Activity
The data presented thus far shows that there are complex relationships among
trade, FDI and production activity. To add further support to this while trying
to clear the picture as much as possible, we next present data on the
geographical distribution of FDI and recent empirical evidence on the
relationship between trade and FDI.

3.3.1 The geographical distribution of FDI
The geographical pattern of FDI is likely to vary across sectors as were
export, import and FDI shares. Table 6.7 provides recent data on the
geographical distribution of FDI stocks, delineating between the service
sector and manufacturing sector.
The geographical pattern of FDI stocks reveals the concentration of
investment in the United Kingdom and Canada. For manufacturing, these two
countries account for 32 per cent of the share of FDI among the top 15
destinations. For the service sector FDI stocks are even more concentrated in
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Table 6.6 Stock and shares of FDI for finance and services, 1995
FDI stock*

PDI share

68 135
32767
1 194
11 6217

27.5
13.2
0.5
46.9

Services
Hotels and lodging
Business services
Automotive rental and leasing
Motion pictures
Health services
Engineering
Management and public relations

2044
15043
2795
1 682
267
1 094
2354

0.8
6.1
1.1
0.7
0.1
0.4
0.9

Other
Au tomotive parking and repair
Miscellaneous repair
Amusement and recreational
Legal services
Education
Accounting and auditing
Research and development
Other commercial services

68
235
1 076
145
41
225
980
1 670

0.0
0.1
0.4
0.1
0.0
0.1
0.4
0.7

Industry classification
Finance
Insurance
Real estate
Holding companies

Total finance and services

248032

Note: *MiIlions of US$. Historical cost basis.
Source: Bureau of Economic Analysis, international Accounts Data.

Canada and the United Kingdom as their combined share is in excess of 40
per cent. In addition, US FDI stocks are highly concentrated in the developed
economies, particularly so in the service sector with 95 per cent of stocks
located in Canada and the ED. Though the developed economies account for
the majority of FDI stocks in both manufacturing and services, and though
Canada and the United Kingdom are the top two nations in each sector, rank
correlations show no significant relation among the pattern of nations across
the two sectors. Hence, location strategies are likely to differ between the
service and manufacturing sectors.
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Table 6.7 Geographical distribution ofFDI for manufacturing and services,
levels and shares, 1995

Manufacturing

FDI*
stock

FDI
share

Services

FDI*
stock

FDI
share

Canada
United Kingdom
Germany
Brazil
Japan
France
Netherlands
Sweden
Italy
Mexico
Belgium
Australia
Ireland
Spain
Switzerland

41 248
27865
23671
17651
16664
16555
10451
10377
9822
8856
8508
8466
6894
5806
3843

19.0
12.9
10.9
8.1
7.7
7.6
4.8
4.8
4.5
4.1
3.9
3.9
3.2
2.7
1.8

United Kingdom
Canada
Belgium
France
Switzerland
Italy
Australia
Netherlands
Germany
Japan
Denmark
Ireland
Sweden
Spain
Mexico

5764
4014
2829
2324
1 440
1 257
1055
1040
955
686
651
621
488
421
412

24.1
16.8
11.8
9.7
6.0
5.2
4.4
4.3
4.0
2.9
2.7
2.6
2.0
1.8
1.7

Note:

* Millions of US$. Historical cost basis.

Source: von der Ruhr (1999),

3.3.2 The impact of FDI on bilateral trade flows
Traditionally FDI and exports were viewed as being substitutes to each
other. In other words, a firm could choose between exporting goods or
capital. Recent theoretical and empirical research show that the
relationship between trade and foreign direct investment is much more
complex, with trade and foreign direct investment actually complementing
each other.
Table 6.8 provides recent empirical evidence by Fontagne and Pajot ( 1998)
on the impact of FDIflows on trade for the manufacturing sector. Because the
authors consider FDI flows, the results below indicate the impact of bilateral
FDI flows on bilateral trade. Countries in the columns are the exporting
countries and countries in the rows are importing countries. The measures are
generated from log-linear export equations that control for such things as
market distance, income levels and market sizes, and reflect the change in
trade flows resulting from the bilateral FDI flows.
As an example, the table indicates that Japan's exports to the United States

Table 6.8

Trade creation resulting from bilateral FDI flows. 1994
US Japan Gennany UK France Italy Netherlands Denmark Sweden Switzerland Spain

N

~

US
Japan
Germany
UK
France
Italy
Netherlands
Denmark
Sweden
Switzerland
Spain
Canada
Australia

86
149
9
101
42
6
17

1
3
2
1
0
11
0
10
1
47 -2
21
3
86
6
20
2

70
12

21
19
4
17
3
-4
16
15
0

98
22
38
35
7
38

63
5
21
14

11
7
13
2
6 -10
23
11
-1
14
-14
29
3

35
2
-7
9
14
6
0
0
1
9

0
16
20
62
15
14

14

0
2

-3
9
-2
0
20
9

5
58

15

11

}

12

0

3

Note: Expressed as a percentage, the additional trade created by bilateral FDI flows.
Source: Fontagne and Pajot (1998).

7

8
0

47
2
-1
6
3

20
2
7

18
8
8
7
4

Canada Australia

99
8
0
-3
2
1
3

10

17
13
0
33

0
0
3

0
0

-}

1

2

0
0
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are 149 per cent higher than they would have been in lieu of bilateral FDI
flows. In turn, US exports to Japan are 86 per cent higher than they would
have been without the bilateral FDI flows. Hence, the US's FDI relationship
with Japan results in a trade deficit as the FDI flows generate more exports to
the US than imports to Japan. In contrast, the bilateral FDI flows between the
United States and Canada and the United Kingdom, whose importance is
demonstrated in the previous table, appear to be trade-balance neutral as they
spur roughly equal amounts of imports and exports. What is evident in the
table is that the bilateral FDI flows complement US imports and exports as
opposed to substituting for them. The authors conclude that because exports
increase, rather than being substituted for, US FDI results in greater US
competitiveness in foreign markets boosting exports from home. Likewise the
increase generated in imports reflects global relocations strategies with
exports from foreign subsidiaries to home.
Fontagne and Pajot consider FDI stocks as well as FDI flows. The
complementary relationships hold for stocks as well as each dollar of outward
FDI stock results in 70 cents of new exports and $1.3 of imports. Hence,
outward US FDI stocks are trade-deficit generating. Inward FOI stock, on the
other hand, has a net substitution effect as each $1 of inward stock results in
a 16 cent decline in imports and a 10 cent decline in exports. Fontagne and
Pajot (1997) include FDI stock for: services in these estimates and find that the
negative trade effect of outward FDI and the positive effect of inward FDI
disappear. The authors reason that FDI in services pertain to subsidiaries in
wholesale trade which explains this outcome.
3.4 Conclusions
Our general conclusions in this section are summarized as follows:
•

•
•

Manufacturing has become much more integrated in the global
economy. Market shares of export, imports, and imported inputs have
all increased significantly since 1975.
The most export-oriented and the most import-oriented industries in
1975 remained so over the last 20 years.
Import penetration increased at a much faster rate for high-import share
industries than low-import share industries.
(a) Changes in import shares are negatively related to the industry's
capital-labour ratio. Hence, increasing rate of import penetration
fall disproportionately on labour-intensive industries.

•

The rising ratio of US merchandise trade to merchandise value-added
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indicates that outsourcing has become more important for the United
States. Data on the share of exports and imports by end~use categories
confirms this conclusion. Hence:
(a) The US is importing products that are closer to the final stage of
production and concentrating on the high value~added stages of
production.
(b) The phenomenon of outsourcing clouds the industry-level data
as comparative advantage now takes place at a level of
production rather than at the industry level. Firm-level data is
required to conduct a more thorough examination.
•

Manufacturing industries with the highest FDI shares (chemicals,
industrial machinery, electronics) tend to have the highest export shares.
(a) Overall, a positive ordinal relationship exists between FDI
shares and export shares.
(b) There is not an apparent relationship between FDI shares and
import and imported-input shares.
(c) Hence, the relationship between trade and FDI appears to be
more complex than the traditional export substitution hypothesis.

•

US manufacturing FDI shares are highly concentrated in the United
Kingdom and Canada, and even more so in the service sector. Canada
and Europe account for a high share of FDI stocks, particularly in
services.
(a) Though Canada and the United Kingdom are the top two
locations of US POI stocks, rank correlations between
manufacturing and services do not verify an ordinal relationship
among the pattern of nations.

•
•

•

Bilateral FDI flows between the US and partner countries have
differing effects on the US trade balance.
Bilateral FDI flows are complements to both US imports and exports.
Hence, FDI flows result in greater US competitiveness abroad in
addition to global relocation strategies which result in exports from
foreign subsidiaries.
Outward US manufacturing POI stocks complement US exports and
imports whereas inward FDI stocks substitute for both imports and
exports. Adding service stocks mitigates the trade deficit effects of
outflows and positive trade effect of inflows.
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In a more general sense, the evidence above shows that US corporations
have effectively pursued globalization strategies over the last 30 years. In
regard to production activity and FOI, outsourcing of low-value-added stages
of production has become more important to US corporations While FDI
continues to be directed to developed nations. In addition, FDI appears to
complement trade as opposed to substituting for it. We conclude, therefore.
that FDI strategies are primarily driven by ownership characteristics with
acquired assets, whether tangible or intangible, complementing the
corporation's existing comparative advantage.

4.

CORPORATE GOVERNANCE AND CAPITAL
ALLOCATION: ALTERNATIVE MODESs

The economic theory of corporate governance is rooted in theories of efficient
allocation of capital. Efficient allocation of capital depends first upon
investors having the knowledge needed to correctly estimate the expected
return and risk of available investment portfolios. (1) Misallocation costs
arise in the absence of such knowledge when scarce capital is not allocated to
its highest yield use, and reflect costly efforts on the part of investors to
acquire better knowledge regarding future states of the world and their
probabilities. But capital markets also link investors who provide capital to
firms which use it for investment purposes, so that the efficient allocation of
capital also depends upon the relationship between investors and firms.
(2) Governance costs are incurred when investors and corporate executives
pursue conflicting goals. and adopt costly measures to achieve their respective
goals. They include: (2a) agency costs (Jensen and Meckling. 1976; Spence.
1973; Stiglitz, 1975), including signalling costs on the part of finns seeking
to demonstrate reliability and trustworthiness to investors and screening!
monitoring costs on the part of investors; and (2b) non-diversification costs
incurred by investors who increase their degree of governance in order to
lower screening and monitoring costS.6
Alternative modes of capital allocation and corporate governance may be
distinguished according to the different regulatory regimes cQuntries adopt to
manage misallocation costs and governance costs. Dietl (1998, pp. 23ft)
identifies two polar extremes in a wide spectrum of regulatory regimes.
neoclassical and relational. systems of regulation, and uses these polar
extremes and a hybrid combination of the two to characterize the US, German
and Japanese modes of capital allocation and corporate governance.
Neoclassical regulation, based on theoretical neoclassical economics,
emphasizes allocative efficiency and competitive capital markets, and
concentrates on removing capital market imperfections due to infonnation
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asymmetries, manipulated markets and market power, Information
asymmetries are addressed through accounting, disclosure and auditing rules,
manipulated markets by prohibiting insider trading, and market power with
anti-takeover laws and prohibition of universal banking (separation of
commercial and investment banking). The latter combined with strict
diversification requirements prevents financial intermediaries from acquiring
control over non-financial institutions. Competitive capital markets are
consequently associated with ownership fragmentation. One consequence of
this is that investors do not commit themselves to long-term investment
relations, since inability to earn governance rents means that investors
discount future cash flows at high rates. Another consequence is that small
corporations have good access to capital markets, since investors are
protected by accounting, disclosure and auditing rules, insider restrictions,
and so on.
Relational regulation, based on the property rights literature, focuses on
governance efficiency and the economics of governance. Ownership
concentration and market manipulation are not considered capital market
imperfections, but rather as means of economizing on governance costs.
Ownership fragmentation favoured in neoclassical regulation is seen as likely
to attenuate property rights, and discourage efficient investments in
governance and control. Concentrated ownership internalizes governance
costs while it limits risk diversification. To compensate for undiversified
investment portfolios, higher. returns to investments in governance are
needed. This implies weak accounting, disclosure and auditing rules, an
absence of prohibitions against insider trading and market manipulation, and
takeover-oriented regulations. Universal banking, the combination of
commercial and investment banking, is also favoured in order to protect
highly· specific investments in corporate governance. Banks acquire greater
ability to govern loans to non-banks, while the latter avoid credit rationing
and undergo smoother restructuring when in financial distress. The resulting
investment perspective is long term in contrast to neoclassical regulation.
Comparing actual national systems of regulation in terms of how well they
address misallocation costs and governance costs requires that we consider
the types of industrial production in which they specialize. Two characteristics
of indus~al development are central to this evaluation: industry maturity and
investment plasticity. (1) Industry maturity occurs when market expansion is
limited. and typically occurs at the expense of competitors, product
improvement is gradual and insiders have large amounts of knowledge for
predicting the return and risk of new investments (for example, auto, steel).
Immatpre industries have low entry barriers and high rates of innovation,
while instability reduces the advantage of insider knowledge (for example,
biotechnology, telecommunications, entertainment, financial services).
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(2) Investment plasticity (Alchian and Woodward, 1987) concerns the
relationship between the investor as principal and corporate executives as
agents. High investment plasticity is associated with discretionary use of
investment funds on the part of corporate executives, and occurs most
commonly in industries especially reliant on human skills (for example,
research laboratories, software, education). More technologically rigid
industries (for example, mining, rail, power generation) have more implastic
investments as investments are more clearly dedicated to identifiable
purposes.
Here we focus on what these two industrial characteristics specifically
imply about national systems of regulation that tend toward the neoclassical
end of the spectrum, since this best describes the US case with which we are
concerned. 7 Though US anti-trust law dates from the beginning of the century,
much important legislation dates from the Depression of the 1930s. Key
shareholder-oriented laws include: the 1933 Securities Act and the 1934
Securities Exchange Act which require registration and extensive disclosure
concerning securities offerings, provide criminal penalties for false and
misleading statements, and prohibit insider trading and market manipulation;
the 1933 Glass-Steagall Act and subsequent laws that separate commercial
and investment banking; and in the 1980s a variety of Supreme Court
decisions allowing states to pass anti-takeover laws. In general, small
investors in the US have many protections and corporate ownership is highly
fragmented compared to Germany and Japan.
As a result of these laws and regulations, the US capital market is the
largest in the world, yet US banks are not large relative to their German and
Japanese counterparts. US holding companies are different from German joint
stock companies and the Japanese equivalent (kabushiki-kaisha) in being
subject to anti-trust regulation, so that intercorporate relationships are less
common in the US. Finally, in recent years the power of corporate insiders has
been increasingly curtailed through the greater presence of outside directors
on corporate boards, a greater role for institutional and relational investors,
shareholder resolutions, separation of CEO and board chair functions, and so
on.
VS. immature industries. Neoclassical systems of regulation such
as the US system are likely to have lower misallocation and governance costs
in connection with immature rather than mature industries. In immature
industries with considerable innovation and product development, the
neoclassical system of regulation has low misallocation costs because
competitive capital markets transmit knowledge on the part of outside
investors, who have an informational advantage over insiders. Governance
costs of the screening/monitoring variety are low, because accounting,

(1) Mature
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auditing and disclosure rules protect small investors and limit the control of
executives. At the same time, accounting, auditing and disclosure rules also
reduce signalling costs on the part of firms seeking investment funds. In
contrast, since in mature industries insider knowledge is necessary and
outside investors are at an informational disadvantage, a system that
encourages their participation may actually impair allocative efficiency. In
addition~ screening/monitoring governance costs will be high for outside
investors when insider knowledge does not transfer readily. These latter costs
are likely to deter investment, and thus unintermediated capital markets tend
to direct insufficient investment funds to firms.
One organizational response to this is the intermediation of capital markets.
Intermediated capital markets in the form of investment banking allow
outsiders to direct capital to mature industries, lowering both misallocation
and screening/monitoring costs. But diversification requirements in
neoclassical systems of regulation prevent banks from acquiring strong
positions in non-bank fmns, and thus capital markets are still likely to underallocate financial resources to mature industries. Holding companies and
multidivisional organizationsll are a further organizational response to the
presence of mature industries in neoclassical systems of regulation, because
they channel investment funds to insiders while allowing them flexibility in
their use. However, anti-trust law and enforcement in neoclassical systems of
regulation also limits this organizational response.
(2) Plastic vs. implastic investment. Neoclassical systems of regulation
such as the US system are also likely to have lower misallocation and
governance costs in industries having implasti.c rather than plastic
investments. Completely implastic investments create no governance
problems, as screening/monitoring costs are minimized, and investors may be
confident that executives will use investment funds as anticipated. At the
same time, unintermediated capital markets are efficient as misallocation
costs are minimal in the presence of accounting, auditing and disclosure rules.
But with plastic investments fmns exercise more discretion over use of
investment funds and high screening/monitoring costs tend to deter
investment, producing insufficient capital flows to firms. Additionally, should
regulations favour outsiders at the expense of insiders, high misallocation
costs are also likely since investors are unlikely to be in a position to
recognize best investment fund uses.
Bank intermediation is an organizational response that may permit higher
levels of investment in virtue of banks t specialization in screening and
monitoring. However, diversification requirements still limit banks and other
financial intermediaries from exercising control over non-bank fInns. Holding
companies and multidivisional organizations are also an efficient
organizational response, since they may integrate firms engaging in highly
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plastic investment in larger organizations with stronger governance structures
(especially where there are strong markets for corporate control). Again, antitrust law and its enforcement limit this organizational response.

5.

IMPLICATIONS FOR US CORPORATION
GLOBALIZATION

We tum to implications of this analysis for US firms in global competition. As
a neoclassical system of regulation, we expect US firms that are successful in
the global economy to more often be in immature industries and involved in
implastic types of investment
First contrast the case of mature industries. We distinguish among mature
industries according to low or high capital expenditure-labor ratios. The US
should have a sizable comparative disadvantage where this ratio is low, and
we would accordingly expect the US to have low levels of POI shares and
high import shares in these industries. Corresponding to this, the six industries
with the lowest FDI shares (leather and leather products, furniture and
fixtures, app~el and other textiles, textile mill products, lumber and wood
products, and paper and allied products) also have the lowest capital-labour
ratios. (The category of other manufacturing is the exception.) These
industries also have the lowest external orientation, ranging from a negative
6.1 per cent to just 4.2 per cent Alternatively, in mature industries in which
the capital expenditure-labour ratio is high (and where economies of scale can
be achieved), US firms may overcome comparative disadvantage by locating
outside the reach of US laws and regulations. While US fIrms are prevented
from forming domestic intercorporate relationships by antitrust law, they may
form joint ventures in foreign markets (recent examples include
DaimlerChrysler, and Mattel-Bandai). This would imply high levels of
foreign direct investment in such industries, and indeed we fmd that five of
the six industries with the highest FDI shares (chemicals and allied products,
petroleum and coal products, food and kindred products, electronic equipment
and transportation equipment) have among the highest (top half) capitallabour ratios. (Industrial machinery is the exception.) Other than food and
petroleum, these industries also have high export shares. However, their
respective external orientation varies.
In the case of immature industries where US antitrust law is not at issue, we
expect FDI to be low, both because there is no need to escape US laws and
regulations, and because the domestic market is still being developed. We take
engineering, management, legal, accounting and research and development
services to be examples of immature industries, and find that their FOI shares
are indeed low. We also expect the import share to be relatively low in
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immature industries, since US firms should be highly competitive in the
domestic market. Examples here include business, professional and technical
services where the export share is more than double the import share. But
there is likely to be additional support for supposing that US firms have
comparative advantage in immature industries when we emphasize the
increasing importance in the global economy of the disintegration of
production. Though there is not sufficient firm-level data on this development, the tendency of US firms to outsource low value-added stages of
production and retain high value-added stages reinforces our conclusion that
business, professional and technical services, such as design, branding,
marketing and service operations, are areas of US comparative advantage.
It is more difficult to determine whether US firms are more successful in
regard to relatively implastic as compared to more plastic investments, since
an efficient organizational response of firms in neoclassical systems of
regulation is the development of holding companies to carry out modest levels
of plastic investment within comparatively large volumes of implastic
investment. Thus firms in industries where plastic investments do occur, such
as biotechnology giants with important laboratory divisions (for example, a
Cargill or an Archer Daniels Midland), also engage in large amounts of
relatively implastic investment. At the same time, the tendency of US firms to
retain the high value-added portions of the production process may still
provide some evidence of an emphasis on implastic forms of investment.
When a firm such as Ford announces that it will reduce its involvement in
manufacturing and assembly in order to concentrate on design, branding,
marketing and service operations, it signals its intention to concentrate on
implastic forms of investment, since these are relatively stable and transparent
forms of business activity (though they are also relatively undeveloped and
immature). Thus we take US firms' observable global activity in business and
professional services as reflecting an increasing comparative advantage in
immature industries and implastic forms of investment.

6.

CONCLUSION

The continuing global integration of markets presents US corporations with
an interesting landscape of opportunities for expansion and profit realization.
The corporation governance system, the set of relationships that yield a
structure through which the corporations' objectives and means are
determined and its progress in reaching those ends are monitored, influences
management's approach to global market opportunities. The forces of global
competition and the relational aspects of the governance system create a
duality of forces that corporations encounter when expanding globally, and
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this duality is captured in the complex relationship that exists among trade and
FDI strategies.
This chapter attempts to detail the alternative paths of globalization that US
industries have followed, and relate this to views of corporate governance
theories of capital allocation and market penetration. The economists'
traditional view of comparative (dis)advantage at the industry level, at least in
manufacturing, now only pertains to a few industries, primarily the most
labour-intensive industries. Rather what exists today is a 'kaleidoscope
comparative advantage' (Bhagwati and Dehejia, 1994) where US corporations
outsource low-value-added levels of production and focus on high-valueadded levels of production in which the US has a comparative advantage.
Furthermore, the traditional view that corporations may either export goods
or export capital, which means that trade and investment are substitute
strategies, has given way to a realization that the relationship between trade
and PDI is quite complex with a complementary relationship existing, at least
among the developed nations. The bulk of US FDI, as it is directed to other
developed nations, is directed by ownership-specific characteristics that
complement US corporations' comparative advantage in the high-innovation,
high-value-added levels of production. Hence, the empirical evidence on the
complex trade-investment relationship reflects a complicated pattern of US
corporations in globalization.
Because we need to relate the data and theories at a much more
disaggregated level, the clear predictions of the neoclassical economic model
of corporate governance are somewhat blunted. Nonetheless, we do find
evidence that US firms are successful in the global economy in immature
industries and also mature industries which engage in high PDI andlor focus
on high value-added stages of the production process. In addition, we find
good reason to suppose that US firms are also successful in relatively
implastic forms of investment, whether these types of investments are carried
out in mature or immature industries. Further research into US firms' areas of
comparative advantage in the world economy awaits better evidence and
better understanding of the processes causing the disintegration of production
while creating 'kaleidoscopic comparative advantage'.

NOTES
I.

2.
3.

The OECD defines corporate governance as a set of relationships between a company's
management, its board, its shareholders and other stakeholders. providing a structure through
which the objectives of the company are set, the means of attaining those objectives are
determined and performance is monitored (OECD, 1999b).
These ratios were calculated from the 1996 Annual Survey of Manufactures, Department of
Commerce. Capital expenditures include new and used capital expenditures.
The Spearman Rank Correlation between the rank of FDI shares and export shares, 48 per
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4.

5.
6.
7.
8.
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cent, is positive and significant at the I per cent level. The Spearman Rank Correlation
between the rank ofFDI shares and external orientation, import shares, imported-input shares
are statistically insignificant.
See Quijano (1990) for information on the Bureau of Economic Analysis' statistics on
foreign direct investment.
This section draws on Dietl (1998).
Misallocation costs may also take the form of non-diversification costs.
Dietl (1998) argues that Germany exhibits a relational system of regulation, and Japan
exhibits a hybrid system of regulation with origins in the relational system.
Holding companies and multidivisional organizations own lOOper cent of their subsidiaries
and are entitled to allocate 100 per cent of their subsidiaries' earnings. The legal structure of
the fonner places more restrictions on doing so than that of the latter.
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